The main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which the notion of farsighted stability for games, introduced by Chwe (1994) , can be applied to directed networks. In particular, we introduce the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork is made up of a collection of directed networks (the nodes) and uniquely represents (via the arcs connecting the nodes) agent preferences and the rules governing network formation. By reformulating Chwe's basic result on the nonemptiness of farsightedly stable sets, we show that for any supernetwork (i.e., for any collection of directed networks and any collection of rules governing network formation), there exists a farsightedly stable directed network. We also introduce the notion of a Nash network relative to a given supernetwork, as well as the notions of symmetric, nonsimultaneous, and decomposable supernetworks. To illustrate the utility of our framework, we present several examples of supernetworks, compute the farsightedly stable networks, and the Nash networks.
Introduction

Overview
Since the seminal paper by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) there has been a rapidly growing literature on social and economic networks and their stability and e¢ciency properties (e.g., see Jackson (2001) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001)). As noted by Jackson (2001) , an important issue that has not yet been addressed in the literature on networks and network formation is the issue of farsighted stability (see Jackson (2001) , p.21 and p.35)). This issue is the focus of our paper. Our main contribution is to construct a framework in which the notion of farsighted stability for games, introduced by Chwe (1994) , can be applied to collections of directed networks. Our construction proceeds in two steps. First, we extend the de…nition of a directed network found in the literature (e.g., see Rockafellar (1984) ). Second, using our extended de…nition we introduce the notion a network formation network. We call such a network a supernetwork. All directed networks are composed of nodes and arcs. In most economic applications, nodes represent economic agents, while arcs represent connections or interactions between agents. In a supernetwork, nodes represent the networks in a given collection, while arcs represent coalition moves and coalitional preferences over the networks in the collection. Given any collection of directed networks and any pro…le of agent preferences over the collection, a supernetwork uniquely represents all the coalitional preferences and all the coalitional moves allowed by the rules governing network formation (i.e., the rules governing the addition, subtraction, or replacement of arcs).
Given the rules governing network formation as represented via the supernetwork, a directed network (i.e., a particular node in the supernetwork) is said to be farsightedly stable if no agent or coalition of agents is willing to alter the network (via the addition, subtraction, or replacement of arcs) for fear that such an alteration might induce further network alterations by other agents or coalitions that in the end leave the initially deviating agent or coalition no better o¤ -and possibly worse o¤. By reformulating Chwe's basic result on the nonemptiness of farsightedly stable sets, we show that for any supernetwork corresponding to a given collection of directed networks, the set of farsightedly stable networks is nonempty.
Our second contribution concerns noncooperative network formation. In particular, we use our framework to de…ne the notion of a Nash network relative to a given supernetwork, and to introduce the notions of symmetric, nonsimultaneous, and decomposable supernetworks. Extending Chwe's (1994) results on Nash equilibrium and farsighted stability, we show that any strict Nash network relative to a given symmetric, nonsimultaneous supernetwork is contained in the set of farsightedly stable networks. We also show that any strict, strong Nash network relative to a given symmetric, decomposable supernetwork is contained in the farsightedly stable set.
In order to illustrate the power and utility of our framework, we present several examples. In our …rst series of examples, we examine, within the context of strategic information sharing, the relationship between the rules governing the formation of information sharing networks and the resulting supernetwork. In order to illustrate the way in which these rules -as represented via the supernetwork -a¤ect the resulting set of farsightedly stable networks as well as the set of Nash networks, we compute the Nash and farsightedly stable networks corresponding to several supernetworks representing various rules. Next, we expand our example of strategic information sharing by adding to the number of possible information sharing networks. Assuming a particular set of network formation rules, we again compute the Nash and farsightedly stable networks relative the supernetwork representing these rules for our expanded collection of information sharing networks. In our expanded example, there is a unique Nash network relative to the given supernetwork, and this unique Nash network is not contained in the set of farsightedly stable networks. Moreover, in our expanded example the set of farsightedly stable networks is equal to the set of Pareto e¢cient networks. Thus, not only is the unique Nash network not farsightedly stable, it is not e¢cient.
In our …nal example we consider the problem of strategic pollution. In particular, we construct the supernetwork corresponding to a discrete, 3-agent version of the Shapley-Shubik garbage game (Shapley and Shubik (1969) ). In the garbage game, each agent has a bag of garbage that can be kept by the agent or dumped onto the property of another agent. The game is discrete in that each agent's bag of garbage cannot be divided up -each agent either keeps his bag or dumps the entire bag onto the property of one other agent. For the garbage game supernetwork, we show that the set of farsightedly stable garbage networks and the set of Nash garbage networks are not equal -but have a nonempty intersection. Moreover, we show that for all farsightedly stable garbage networks, each agent ends up with one bag garbage. Thus, the garbage network in which each agent keeps his own bag of garbage, and therefore chooses not to pollute his neighbor, is farsightedly stable. This is not the case for the set of Nash garbage networks. In particular, there are Nash garbage networks in which agents choose to pollute others (i.e., pollution is a Nash equilibrium).
Directed Networks vs Linking Networks
In a directed network, each arc possesses an orientation or direction: arc j connecting nodes i and i 0 must either go from node i to node i 0 or must go from node i 0 to node i: 1 In an undirected (or linking) network, arc j would have no orientation and would simply indicate a connection or link between nodes i and i 0 . Under our extended de…nition of directed networks, nodes are allowed to be connected by multiple arcs. For example, nodes i and i 0 might be connected by arcs j and j 0 ; with arc j running from node i to i 0 and arc j 0 running in the opposite direction (i.e., from node i 0 to node i). 2 Thus, if node i represents a seller and node i 0 a buyer, then arc j might represent a contract o¤er by the seller to the buyer, while arc j 0 might represent the acceptance or rejection of that contract o¤er. Also, under our extended de…nition arcs are allowed to be used multiple times in a given network. For example, arc j might be used to connect nodes i and i 0 as well as nodes i 0 and i 00 . However, we do not allow arc j to go from node i to node i 0 multiple times in the same direction. By allowing arcs to possess direction and be used multiple times and 1 We denote arc j going from node i to node i 0 via the ordered pair (j; (i; i 0 )), where (i; i 0 ) is also an ordered pair. Alternatively, if arc j goes from node i 0 to node i, we write (j; (i 0 ; i)): 2 Under our extended de…nition, arc j 0 might also run in the same direction as arc j.
by allowing nodes to be connected by multiple arcs, our extended de…nition makes possible the application of networks to a richer set of economic environments. Until now, most of the economic literature on networks has focused on linking networks (see for example, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) ). Given a particular directed network, an agent or a coalition of agents can change the network to another network by simply adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs from the existing network in accordance with certain rules represented via the supernetwork. 3 For example, if the nodes in a network represent agents, then the rule for adding an arc j from node i to node i 0 might require that both agents i and i 0 agree to add arc j: Whereas the rule for subtracting arc j, from node i to node i 0 ; might require that only agent i or agent i 0 agree to dissolve arc j:
In current research, we are analyzing the e¢ciency properties of farsightedly stable networks. While here we focus on directed networks, the same methodology can be used to deduce the existence of farsightedly stable undirected networks (i.e., linking networks -such as the networks considered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) ). An excellent paper on stability and e¢ciency in linking networks is Jackson (2001) (see also, Jackson and Watts (1998), Jackson and van den Nouweland (2000), Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) , Watts (2001) , and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001)). In future research, we will focus on the dynamics of network formation -along the lines of Konishi and Ray (2001) . 3 Put di¤erently, agents can change one network to another network by adding, subtracting, or replacing ordered pairs, (j; (i; i 0 )); in accordance with certain rules.
Directed Networks
We begin by giving a formal de…nition of the class of directed networks we shall consider. Let N be a …nite set of nodes, with typical element denoted by i, and let A be a …nite set of arcs, with typical element denoted by j. Arcs represent potential connections between nodes, and depending on the application, nodes can represent economic agents or economic objects such as markets or …rms. 4 De…nition 1 (Directed Networks) Given node set N and arc set A; a directed network, G; is a subset of A £ (N £ N). We shall denote by N(N; A) the collection of all directed networks given N and A:
A directed network G 2 N(N; A) speci…es how the nodes in N are connected via the arcs in A: Note that in a directed network order matters. In particular, if (j; (i; i 0 )) 2 G; this means that arc j goes from node i to node i 0 : Also, note that under our de…nition of a directed network, loops are allowed -that is, we allow an arc to go from a given node back to that given node. Finally, note that under our de…nition an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and multiple arcs can go from one node to another. However, our de…nition does not allow an arc j to go from a node i to a node i 0 multiple times. The following notation is useful in describing networks. Given directed network
Thus, G(j) is the set of node pairs connected by arc j in network G, G(i) is the set of arcs going from node i or coming to node i in network G; G(i; i 0 ) is the set of arcs going from node i to node i 0 in network G; and G(j; i) is the set of nodes which can be reached by arc j from node i in network G:
Note that if for some arc j 2 A, G(j) is empty, then arc j is not used in network G: Moreover, if for some node i 2 N , G(i) is empty then node i is not used in network G, and node i is said to be isolated relative to network G.
If in our de…nition of a directed network, we had required that G(j) be singlevalued and nonempty for all arcs j 2 A, then our de…nition would have been the same as that given by Rockafellar (1984) .
Suppose that the node set N is given by N = fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i 5 g ; while the arc set A is given by A = fj 1 ; j 2 ; : : : ; j 5 ; j 6 ; j 7 g : Consider the network, G; depicted in Figure 1 . In network G; G(j 6 ) = f(i 4 ; i 4 )g: Thus, (j 6 ; (i 4 ; i 4 )) 2 G is a loop: Also, in network G; arc j 7 is not used. Thus, G(j 7 ) = ;: 5 Finally, note that G(i 4 ) = fj 4 ; j 5 ; j 6 g, while G(i 5 ) = ;. Thus, node i 5 is isolated relative to G: 6 Consider the new network, G 0 2 N(N; A) depicted in Figure 2 . The fact that arc j7 is not used in network G can also be denoted by writing
where projAG denotes the projection onto A of the subset
representing the network. 6 If the loop (j7; (i5; i5)) were part of network G in Figure 1 , then node i5 would no longer be considered isolated under our de…nition. Moreover, we would have G(i 5 ) = fj 7 g.
In network G 0 ; G 0 (j 1 ) = f(i 1 ; i 2 ); (i 3 ; i 1 )g : Thus, (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 )) 2 G 0 and (j 1 ; (i 3 ; i 1 )) 2 G 0 : Note that in network G 0 ; node i 5 is no longer isolated. In particular, G 0 (i 5 ) = fj 6 ; j 7 g: Also, note that nodes i 2 and i 4 are connected by two di¤erent arcs pointed in opposite directions. Under our de…nition of a directed network it is possible to alter network G 0 by replacing arc j 5 from i 4 to i 2 with arc j 4 from i 4 to i 2 : However, it is not possible under our de…nition to replace arc j 5 from i 4 to i 2 with arc j 4 from i 2 to i 4 -because our de…nition does not allow j 4 to go from i 2 to i 4 multiple times. Finally, note that nodes i 1 and i 3 are also connected by two di¤erent arcs, but arcs pointed in the same direction. In particular, G(i 3 ; i 1 ) = fj 1 ; j 3 g.
Supernetworks
De…nition
Let D denote a …nite set of agents (or economic decision making units) with typical element denoted by d, and let 2 D denote the collection of all nonempty subsets (or coalitions) of D with typical element denoted by S: We shall denote by jSj the number agents in coalition S.
Given collection of directed networks G µ N(N; A), we shall assume that each agent's preferences over networks in G are speci…ed via a network payo¤ function,
Moreover, coalition S 0 2 2 D prefers network G 0 to network G if and only if
By viewing each network G in a given collection of directed networks G µ N(N; A) as a node in a larger network, we can give a precise network representation of the rules governing network formation as well as agents' preferences. To begin, let (i.e., by an m-arc, belonging to coalition S 0 , going from node G to node G 0 ) the fact that coalition S 0 2 2 D can change network G to network G 0 by adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in network G: Moreover, we shall denote by
, by a p-arc, belonging to coalition S 0 , going from node G to node G 0 ) the fact that each agent in coalition S 0 2 2
by adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in network G; and
Thus, supernetwork G speci…es how the networks in G are connected via coalitional moves and coalitional preferences -and thus provides a network representation of preferences and the rules of network formation. Remarks:
(1)Under our de…nition of a supernetwork, m-arc loops and p-arc loops are ruled out. Thus, for any network G and coalition S 0 ,
While m-arc loops are ruled out by de…nition, the absence of p-arc loops in supernetworks is due to the fact that each agent's preferences over networks are irre ‡exive. In particular, for each agent
The de…nition of agent preferences via the network payo¤ functions,
also rules out the following types of p-arc connections:
Thus, for all coalitions S 0 2 2 D and networks G and G 0 contained in G,
(4) Under our de…nition of a supernetwork, multiple m-arcs, as well as multiple p-arcs, connecting networks G and G 0 in supernetwork G are allowed: Thus, in supernetwork G the following types of m-arc and p-arc connections are possible:
For coalitions S and S 0 , with S 6 = S 0
However, multiple m-arcs, or multiple p-arcs, from network G 2 G to network G 0 2 G belonging to the same coalition are not allowed -and moreover, are unnecessary. Allowing multiple arcs can be very useful in many applications. For example, multiple m-arcs (not belonging to the same coalition) connecting networks G and G 0 in a given supernetwork G denote the fact that in supernetwork G there is more than one way to get from network G to network G 0 -or put di¤erently, there is more than one way to change network G to network G 0 . (5) In many economic applications, the set of nodes, N , used in de…ning the networks in the collection G, and the set of economic agents D are one and the same (i.e., in many applications N = D).
The following notation, analogous to the notation introduced in expression (1) for directed networks, is useful in describing the m-arc connections in supernetworks.
Similar notation can be introduced to describe p-arc connections. Thus,
is the set of network pairs connected by move arc m S in supernetwork G, G(G) is the set of move arcs going from network G or coming to network G in supernetwork G; G(G; G 0 ) is the set of move arcs going from network G to network G 0 in supernetwork G; and G(m S ; G) is the set of networks which can be reached by move arc m S from network G in supernetwork G:
Note that if G(m S ) is empty for some move arc m S 2 M, then in supernetwork G coalition S is not permitted to make any changes in any network, and thus in supernetwork G, coalition S is isolated and has no power. Also, note that if for some network G 2 G, G(G) is empty, then network G is isolated relative to supernetwork G. Finally, note that the set G(m S ; G) is simply the set of all the networks in G to which coalition S can deviate in supernetwork G starting from network G:
Supernetwork Classi…cations
A supernetwork G is symmetric if any move from one network to another brought about by some coalition can be reversed by that coalition. G is closely connected if it is possible to get from one non-isolated network to another non-isolated in one move via some m-arc. G is simple if there is one and only one way to get from one network to another via an m-arc. 7 G is nonsimultaneous if any move from one network to another can only be brought about by a single agent (i.e., by one agent acting alone). Finally, G is decomposable if any move from one network G to another network G 0 brought about by some coalition S consisting of more than one agent can 7 Thus, if supernetwork G is simple, then
be decomposed for each agent d 2 S into two moves, a move from network G to some network G 00 by coalition Snfdg, and then a move from network G 00 to network G 0 by agent d. Formally, we have the following de…nitions.
is said to be closely connected if for all networks G and G 0 in G, not isolated relative to G,
is either empty or consists of a single arc: In supernetwork G, the move from network G to network G 0 by coalition S, jSj > 1, is decomposable for each agent d 2 S into a move from network G to some network G 00 by coalition Snfdg followed by a move from network G 00 to network G 0 by agent d:
If supernetwork G is symmetric, then for all coalitions S 2 2 D and all pairs of networks (G;
Moreover, if supernetwork G is simple, then for all coalitions S 2 2 D and all pairs of networks (G;
Thus, if supernetwork G is simple, then there is one and only one way to get from one network to another via an m-arc.
It is important to note that under our general de…nition of supernetworks, supernetworks are not required to be symmetry, closely connected, simple, nonsimultaneous, or decomposable.
Network Formation Rules and Supernetwork Classi…cations
In this subsection we shall present several examples illustrating the connections between the rules governing network formation and supernetworks. For concreteness, we shall focus on the problem of strategic information sharing.
To begin, consider a situation in which three individuals, i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 , have private information, and assume that only three con…gurations of information sharing arrangements are possible. In Figure 4 we have represented these con…gurations as an information sharing networks. For example in network G 1 , the arc j 1 running from agent i 1 to agent i 2 indicates that agent i 1 observes the private information of agent i 2 . In fact, in network G 1 there is full information sharing: each agent observes the private information of the other agents. Note that in this example the set of agents D = fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g and the set of nodes N are one and the same.
In order to construct a supernetwork over our collection
we must …rst specify the rules governing network formation -and therefore, we must specify the rules governing the establishment or termination of information sharing arrangements. We shall consider several possibilities.
An Example without Symmetry: We begin with an example in which the rules governing network formation are such that the resulting supernetwork is not symmetric -nor is it simple, nonsimultaneous, or decomposable, but it is closely connected.
Rules 0 -Asymmetric Network Formation Rules (arc addition is bilateral -arc subtraction is unilateral): In order for an agent to observe another agent's private information (for example, in order for agent i 1 to observe agent i 0 2 s private information, and therefore, in order to establish an arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ), both agents must agree to this arrangement. Thus, adding an arc requires a bilateral agreement (i.e., arc addition is bilateral). However, either agent (or both agents acting together) can terminate such an arrangement (i.e., either agent or both agents can remove the arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ). Thus, subtracting an arc can be accomplished by a unilateral decision (i.e., arc subtraction can be unilateral). Figure 5 depicts the m-arc connections between networks, G 1 , G 2 and G 3 in the supernetwork G 0 corresponding to these rules. Because the rules of governing network formation are a mix of bilateral and unilateral rules, the m-arc connections in supernetwork G 0 are asymmetric. For example, in Figure 5 , moving from network G 1 to network G 2 requires the removal of arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 (indicating the termination of an arrangement whereby agent i 1 observes the private information of agent i 2 ). According to the rules, the removal of this arc can be accomplished by agent i 1 , by agent i 2 , or by both agents acting together. Thus, in Figure 5 there are three m-arcs, m fi 1 g , m fi 2 g , and m fi 1 ;i 2 g , running from network G 1 to network G 2 : However, because the move from network G 2 to network G 1 requires the addition of arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 (indicating the establishment of an arrangement whereby agent i 1 observes the private information of agent i 2 ), the rules require that both agents i 1 and i 2 agree to the addition of this arc. Hence, there is only one m-arc, m fi1;i2g , running from network G 2 to network G 1 . Because there is an m fi1;i2g -arc running from network G 1 to network G 2 , and an m fi1;i2g -arc running from network G 2 to network G 1 , the m fi 1 ;i 2 g -arc connecting networks G 1 and G 2 depicted in Figure  5 has arrow heads at both ends.
Two Examples with Symmetry: In the next two examples the rules governing network formation are such that the corresponding supernetworks are symmetric, closely connected, and simple, but are not nonsimultaneous and not decomposable.
Symmetric Example 1 Suppose the rules governing the establishment or termination of information sharing arrangements are as follows:
Rules 1 -Symmetric Network Formation Rules 1 (purely bilateral): In order for an agent to observe another agent's private information (for example, in order for agent i 1 to observe agent i 0 2 s private information, and therefore, in order to establish an arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ), both agents must agree to this arrangement. Moreover, in order to terminate such an arrangement, both agents must agree (i.e., both agents must agree to remove the arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ).
As depicted in Figure 6 , under these purely bilateral rules, the resulting supernetwork G 1 is symmetric and simple. In general, if the rules governing the establishment or termination of information sharing arrangements are purely bilateral or purely unilateral, then the resulting supernetwork will be symmetric and simple. It is also easy to see from Figure 6 that supernetwork G 1 is closely connected, but is not nonsimultaneous or decomposable. an agent to observe another agent's private information (for example, in order for agent i 1 to observe agent i 0 2 s private information, and therefore, in order to establish an arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ), all that is required is that the agent unilaterally initiate the arrangement. Moreover, in order to terminate this arrangement, all that is required is that the agent who initiated the arrangement, unilaterally terminate the arrangement. (i.e., all that is required is that agent i 1 remove arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ).
As depicted in Figure 7 , under purely unilateral rules the resulting supernetwork G 2 is symmetric and simple. G 2 is also closely connected, but it is not nonsimulta-neous or decomposable. Note that in moving from network G 1 to network G 3 both agents i 1 and i 2 must act simultaneously and unilaterally to remove an arc, and in moving from network G 3 to network G 1 both agents i 1 and i 2 must act simultaneously and unilaterally to add an arc. Thus, in Figure 7 there is an m fi 1 ;i 2 g -arc connecting networks G 1 and G 3 with arrow heads at both ends.
An Example of a Symmetric, Simple and Nonsimultaneous Supernetwork: Suppose we modify Rules 2 as follows:
Rules 3 -Symmetric Network Formation Rules 3 (purely unilateral and nonsimultaneous): In order for an agent to observe another agent's private information (for example, in order for agent i 1 to observe agent i 0 2 s private information, and therefore, in order to establish an arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ), all that is required is that the agent unilaterally initiate the arrangement. Moreover, in order to terminate this arrangement, all that is required is that the agent who initiated the arrangement, unilaterally terminate the arrangement. (i.e., all that is required is that agent i 1 remove arc j 1 from i 1 to i 2 ). Finally, starting from any given con…guration of information sharing arrangements (as represented by a given information sharing network), only one agent at a time can change the existing con…guration.
As depicted in Figure 8 , under Rules 3 the resulting supernetwork G 3 is symmetric, simple, nonsimultaneous, and decomposable. However, G 3 is not closely connected. 
Farsighted Dominance and Farsighted Stability
Given supernetwork G ½ A £ (G £ G), we say that network G 0 2 G farsightedly dominates network G 2 G if there is a …nite sequence of networks, G 0 ; G 1 ; : : : ; G h ; with G = G 0 , G 0 = G h ; and G k 2 G for k = 0; 1; : : : ; h; and a corresponding sequence of coalitions, S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : ; S h ; such that for k = 1; 2; : : : ; h
and
We shall denote by G CC G 0 the fact that network G 0 2 G farsightedly dominates network G 2 G: Figure 9 below provides a network representation of the farsighted dominance relation in terms of m-arcs and p-arcs. In Figure 9 , network G 3 farsightedly dominates network G 0 : 
Thus, a subset of directed networks F G is farsightedly stable if given any network G 0 2 F G and any m S 1 -deviation to network G 1 2 G by coalition S 1 (via adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs) there exists further deviations leading to some network G 2 2 F G where the initially deviating coalition S 1 is not better o¤ -and possibly worse o¤.
There can be many farsightedly stable sets. We shall denote by F ? G the largest farsightedly stable set: Thus, if F G is a farsightedly stable set, then F G ½ F ? G :
Nonemptiness of the Largest Farsightedly Stable Set
By reformulating Chwe's existence and nonemptiness results for the supernetwork framework, we are able to conclude that any supernetwork contains a nonempty set of farsightedly stable networks. N(N; A) be a collection of directed networks. Given any supernetwork Proof. The existence of a unique, largest farsightedly stable set, F ?
G , follows from Proposition 1 in Chwe (1994) . Moreover, since the set of networks, G, is …nite and since each agent's preferences over networks are irre ‡exive, nonemptiness follows from the Corollary to Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994).
5 Nash Networks
De…nitions
Within the framework developed above, we can de…ne various Nash-type notions for networks relative to a given supernetwork. 8 De…nition 5 (Nash Networks, Strict Nash Networks, and Strict Strong Nash Networks)
Given directed networks G µ N(N; A), agent preferences fv d (¢) : d 2 Dg ; and arc set A := M [ P; let G ½ A £ (G £ G) be a supernetwork:
(1) A network G ¤ 2 G is said to be a Nash network relative to supernetwork G if for all agents
(2) A network G ¤ 2 G is said to be a strict Nash network relative to supernetwork
(3) A network G ¤ 2 G is said to be a strict strong Nash network relative to supernetwork G if for all coalitions S 2 2 D and all networks G 2 G(m S ; G ¤ )
8 In their interesting paper on noncooperative network formation, Bala and Goyal (2000) de…ne the notion of a Nash network for one and two-way linking networks, for a particular set of noncooperative network formation rules. For example, in their framework the rules of network formation allow each agent to form links (one-way or two-way depending on the context) with any other agent. This contrasts with our framework which allows arbitrary restrictions to be placed on link formation. Moreover, in our framework, the notions of Nash and farsightedly stable networks are de…ned relative to any given set of network formation rules (rules represented via a supernetwork).
The Relationship Between Nash and Farsightedly Stable Networks
The following results, which relate strict Nash and strict strong Nash networks to farsightedly stable networks, extend Propositions 5 and 6 in Chwe (1994) to the supernetwork setting developed here.
Theorem 2 (Strict and Strict Strong Nash Networks Are Farsightedly Stable) Let G ½ A £ (G £ G) be a given supernetwork.
(1) Let G ¤ be a strict Nash network relative to supernetwork G. If G is symmetric and nonsimultaneous, then G ¤ is a farsightedly stable network relative to G:
(2) Let G ¤ be a strict strong Nash network relative to supernetwork G. If G is symmetric and decomposable, then G ¤ is a farsightedly stable network relative to G:
Proof. Part (1) follows immediately from Proposition 5 in Chwe (1994). To prove part (2) we begin by de…ning the following mapping:
Let P(G) denote the collection of all subsets (i.e., subcollections) of G (including the empty set or the empty subcollection), and de…ne the mapping
as follows: for subcollection of networks H 2 P(G) and network
By Proposition 1 in Chwe (1994), a subcollection F ? G of G is the unique, largest farsightedly stable set if and only if F ?
G is a …xed point of the mapping ¤ G (¢) (i.e., if and only if
, the mapping ¤ G (¢) has a …xed point -but it may be empty. However, if there exists a nonempty subcollection of networks H such that
G . We show here that for G a symmetric and decomposable supernetwork, if G ¤ is a strict strong Nash network relative to G, then
In fact, it su¢ces to show that if G ¤ is a strict strong Nash network relative to a symmetric, decomposable supernetwork G, then
Now suppose statement (*) holds for all coalitions S 0 of size k (i.e., jS 0 j = k): We will show that under this induction hypothesis, statement (*) continues to hold for all coalitions S 0 of size k +1:
). By symmetry, G 00 2 G(m fd 0 g ; G 0 ) and
).
A strict Nash network in a symmetric supernetwork G that is not nonsimultaneous may or may not be farsightedly stable. Moreover, a strict, strong Nash network in a symmetric supernetwork G that is not decomposable may or may not be farsightedly stable.
Computational Examples
In this section, we compute the Nash and farsightedly stable networks for several examples. All of our computations are carried out using a Mathematica package developed by Kamat and Page (2001).
The Nash and Farsightedly Stable Networks Relative to Information Sharing Supernetworks
In this subsection, we again focus on our collection,
of information sharing networks. In particular, we compute the Nash and farsightedly stable networks corresponding to the supernetworks G 0 , G 1 , G 2 ; and G 3 presented in section 3.3 above. In computing the Nash and farsightedly stable networks we shall assume that agents' network payo¤ functions,
are given by the following table: Table 1 : Payo¤s to Information Sharing Networks Reading across the …rst row of payo¤s, agent i 0
The Supernetwork G 0 For asymmetric supernetwork G 0 ; with m-arcs depicted in Figure 6 , the farsightedly stable set of networks, F ? G0 , is given by F ? G0 = fG 3 g ; and the set of Nash networks, N G 0 , is also given by
In this example, asymmetries in the network formation rules favor the termination of information sharing arrangements. As a result, given agents' network payo¤s, in the only farsightedly stable network information sharing is the network in which there is the least information sharing.
The Supernetwork G 1 For the symmetric supernetwork G 1 , with m-arcs depicted in Figure 7 , F ?
is given by
and the set of Nash networks, N G 1 , is also given by
Thus, for supernetwork G 1
In this example, the network formation rules make it equally di¢cult to establish or terminate information sharing arrangements. As a result, all the information sharing networks in the collection G are farsightedly stable as well as Nash. In this particular example, all networks are Nash under our de…nition because no single agent defections from a given network are possible.
The Supernetwork G 2 For the symmetric and decomposable supernetwork G 2 , with m-arcs depicted in Figure 8 , F ? G2 is given by F ? G 2 = fG 1 ; G 3 g; while the set of Nash networks, N G2 , is given by
Here, the network formation rules are purely unilateral, making it easy for each agent to establish or terminate information sharing arrangements. However, the payo¤s in Table 1 are such that the extremes of maximal and minimal information sharing emerge as the farsightedly stable networks. Thus, for supernetwork G 2
The Supernetwork G 3 For the symmetric and nonsimultaneous supernetwork G 3 , with m-arcs depicted in Figure 9 , F ? G3 is given by F ? G3 = fG 1 ; G 2 g; while the set of Nash networks, N G3 , is given by
In this example, the network formation rules are purely unilateral and simultaneous moves are not allowed. Note that with simultaneity eliminated, under the payo¤s in Table 1 
The above series of examples illustrates how the rules governing network formation, as represented via supernetworks, a¤ect the set of farsightedly stable networks as well as the set of Nash networks. In all of the examples above the set of Nash networks is equal to or contained in the set of farsightedly stable networks. In the next subsection, we expand upon on our information sharing examples and we show that, in general, it is not the case that the Nash networks are contained in the farsightedly stable set.
Strategic Information Sharing: An Expanded Example
Information Sharing Networks
Again consider the problem of strategic information sharing for the case in which three individuals, i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 , have private information, but now consider the collection of all possible information sharing networks, assuming that each agent observes the private information of at least one other agent. Denote this collection by G I . Table 2 lists all the information sharing networks contained in the collection.
((j 3 ; (i 3 ; i 1 )) (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 1 )) (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 3 )) ((j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 1 )); (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 3 ))) (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 Note that network G 27 in Table 2 corresponds to network G 1 in our previous information sharing examples -while network G 24 in Table 2 corresponds to network G 2 , and network G 22 in Table 2 corresponds to network G 3 : Also, note that our collection of networks G I listed in Table 2 is a proper subset of the collection of all possible networks N(N; A) given node set N = fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g and arc set A = fj 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 g: In this example, the set of nodes, N = fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g, and the set of agents D are one and the same, and the subscript on each arc denotes the agent to whom the arc belongs, and thus identi…es the node from which the arc must emanate. In constructing the supernetwork over collection G I we shall assume that the rules governing network formation are purely unilateral (see Rules 2 above). Thus, the resulting supernetwork, G I ; is symmetric, closely connected, simple, and decomposable, but not nonsimultaneous. Moreover, in supernetwork G I no network in collection G I is isolated. Table 3 below gives the net payo¤s to agents corresponding to the networks in collection G I under the payo¤ rules listed above.
Payo¤s
((j 3 ; (i 3 ; i 1 )) (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 1 )) (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 3 )) ((j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 1 )); (j 2 ; (i 2 ; i 3 ))) (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 )) (¡4; ¡4; 3) (¡3; ¡3; ¡3) (¡6; ¡1; ¡3) (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 )) (¡4; 3; ¡4) (¡4; 3; ¡4) (¡7; 6; ¡7) ((j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 )); (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 ))) (¡2; ¡3; ¡3) (¡1; ¡3; ¡6) (¡4; 0; ¡9)
(¡4; ¡4; 3) (3; ¡4; ¡4) (¡3; ¡2; ¡3) (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 )) (¡3; ¡3; ¡3) (3; ¡4; ¡4) (¡3; ¡1; ¡6) ((j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 )); (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 ))) (¡1; ¡6; ¡3) (6; ¡7; ¡7) (0; ¡4; ¡9)
(¡7; ¡7; 6) (¡3; ¡6; ¡1) (¡9; ¡4; 0) (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 )) (¡6; ¡3; ¡1) (¡3; ¡3; ¡2) (¡9; 0; ¡4) ((j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 2 )); (j 1 ; (i 1 ; i 3 ))) (¡4; ¡9; 0) (0; ¡9; ¡4) (¡6; ¡6; ¡6) Moreover, since the farsightedly stable set F ? GI is externally stable (see Theorem 1 above), there exists some farsightedly stable network G 2 F ?
GI that farsightedly dominates the Nash network G 27 . Thus, G BB G 27 for some G 2 F ?
GI . Before moving to our last example, let us consider the issue of Pareto e¢ciency. De…ne the set of Pareto e¢cient networks relative to the collection G I as follows:
Given the payo¤s in Table 3 , the set of Pareto e¢cient networks, E I , is equal to the set of farsightedly stable networks. Thus, not only is the Nash network G 27 farsightedly dominated by some network in F ?
, it is also Pareto dominated by some network in F ?
. Unfortunately, equality of the set of farsightedly stable networks and the set of e¢cient networks is not a general property of farsightedly stable sets in supernetworks. In fact, it is possible to construct a supernetwork example in which the set of e¢cient networks and the set of farsightedly stable networks are non-intersecting.
Strategic Pollution: The Garbage Game
In this our last example, we construct the supernetwork corresponding to a discrete, 3-agent version of the Shapley-Shubik garbage game (Shapley and Shubik (1969) ). In the garbage game, each agent, i 1 ; i 2 ; and i 3 , has a bag of garbage which can be kept by the agent or dumped onto the property of another agent. The game is discrete in that each agent's bag of garbage cannot be divided up -each agent either keeps the bag or dumps it on the property of one other agent. In the network representation of the garbage game, each agent has under his control one arc which must begin at the node representing that agent. The ending node of the arc indicates where the agent has chosen to dump his garbage. For example, if arc j 1 (the arc under the control of agent 1) runs from node i 1 to node i 3 this means that agent i 1 has chosen to dump his bag of garbage on the property of agent i 3 . Alternatively, if agent i 1 decides to keep his bag of garbage, this is denoted by the arc j 1 running from node i 1 to node i 1 (i.e., by a loop). Thus, the rules for adding or subtracting arcs are purely unilateral (see Rules 2 above). Figure 12 depicts the garbage network corresponding to a particular con…guration of dumping strategies. In the garbage network depicted in Figure 12 , agent i 1 dumps his garbage onto agent i 2 , agent i 2 dumps his garbage onto agent i 3 , and agent i 3 keeps his garbage. We shall assume that the payo¤ to each agent in any given garbage network is given by ¡b where b = 0; 1; 2; 3 is number of bags of garbage the agent ends up with in that network. Thus, the payo¤ to each agent in the garbage network, G, depicted in Figure 12 is given by v i 1 (G) = 0; v i 2 (G) = ¡1; and v i 3 (G) = ¡2: Table 4 lists all the possible networks. We shall denote by G P the collection of networks in Table 4 . Figure 13 depicts the garbage networks contained in F ? Again, an interesting pattern emerges: in each of the farsighted stable networks in supernetwork G P , each agent ends up with one bag of garbage -an outcome equivalent, in terms of payo¤, to each agent keeping his bag of garbage. By reasoning farsightedly, agents always end up with an equitable outcome.
Relative to supernetwork G P , the set of Nash garbage networks is given by N G P = fG 4 ; G 6 ; G 7 ; G 9 ; G 13 ; G 15 ; G 16 ; G 18 g: Figure 14 depicts the Nash garbage networks. 
